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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the differing policy responses to the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis in Korea, in terms of financial, industrial, foreign 
exchange, labor and welfare policies. For the aim, this paper narrates the following items: 
the characteristics of and difference between the two economic crises; the varying policy 
responses to the two economic crises; policy outcomes in the two economic crises; and policy 
implications for potential economic crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
South Korea (hereinafter Korea) has suffered from two global economic tsunamis in 
recent years: one from the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the other from the 2008 global 
financial crisis. For a long while, Korea has maintained rapid economic growth, making her 
one of the four Asian tiger economies. Nevertheless, fundamental limitations of Korea‟s 
geographically small space and demographically narrow internal market poses a challenge. 
Accordingly, since the beginning, Korea has adopted a government-led, export-driven 
economic growth strategy, making her sensitive to the ever-fluctuating global economic 
environment. 
The Asian economic crisis in 1997 rendered the Korean government to resort to the IMF 
for bailout loan. Although it was left with no alternative options but to adhere to the stringent 
IMF guideline of economic restructuring, Korea overcame economic difficulties successfully 
through the timely implementation of a bundle of policies to tackle the previously unheard-of 
economic catastrophe. 
The aftermath of 2008 global financial crisis, originating from the Wall Street 
bankruptcies, once again plunged Korea into an economic devastation. The Korean 
government employed diverse policy measures to cope with this economic turmoil and was 
again successful in surmounting the world economic tsunami. The fundamental difference 
between the two cases of economic crises was that they were managed by ideologically 
contrasting political regimes. While the 1997 economic crisis was handled by the progressive 
(or liberal) political regime, the 2008 economic crisis was managed by the conservative one. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to explore the differing policy 
responses to the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis in Korea, in 
terms of financial, industrial, labor and welfare policies that the Korean government adopted 
to tackle the two economic crises respectively. For the aim, this paper narrates the following 
items: the characteristics of and difference between the two economic crises; the varying 
policy responses to the two economic crises; the differing policy outcomes in the two 
economic crises; and policy implications for potential economic crisis. 
2. The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and Policy Responses 
2.1 Causes of the 1997 Asian economic crisis 
The 1997 economic crisis was caused by diverse and complicated factors. Even though it 
was directly triggered by Asian financial insolvency, the symptom of crisis was structurally 
embedded in the Korean economy (Winters, 1998). At the time of 1997 economic crisis began, 
Korea‟s macroeconomic indices were not so bad. The government‟s financial earnings and 
expenses were in balance, and the rate of current-account deficit to GDP was under 2% in the 
1990s, except for 4.4% in 1996. Total savings rate was over 30%, and the increasing rate of 
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consumer price was below 5%. Foreign exchange rate was not so fluctuated (Chung, 1999). 
However, financial and business sectors were decaying from roots by the government‟s 
excessive intervention and unreasonable protection under the tradition of the longstanding 
developmental state of Korea. The government failed to properly manage financial and 
monetary policies. The Asian economic crisis, triggered by the collapse of Thai Bat in July 
1997, spread to Korea (Haggard and Mo, 2000). 
The 1997 economic crisis was an overall crisis, combined with financial, business, and 
foreign exchange crises. Amongst them, foreign exchange crisis proceeded to financial crisis 
and they together led to business crisis. Foreign exchange rate jumped up and foreign capital 
outflowed in massive scale from Korean financial market, causing the domino collapse of 
financial institutions. As a natural result, the business sector that depended on high-level of 
debt became insolvent. The Korean economy collapsed. Immediately after deciding to ask for 
the IMF bail-out in November 1997, the distribution rate of corporate bonds jumped to 29% 
yearly, and foreign exchange rate to US dollar reached 1,965 Korean won. Foreign-exchange 
reserves decreased to only 3.9 billion dollar. While real GDP growth rate was - 6.7% in 1998, 
unemployment rate exceeded 8% from below 2% before the economic crisis (Lee J., 2003). 
Table 1 portrays the deteriorated situation of Korean economy in the 1990s. 
Table 1 Changes in macroeconomic indices in the 1990s (%) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real GDP growth rate 9.2 5.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 -6.8 
Consumer price 
increasing rate 
9.3 6.3 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.5 7.5 
Total savings rate 37.3 36.4 36.2 35.5 35.5 33.8 33.4 33.2 
Fiscal account surplus  
to GDP 
-1.9 -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 -1.5 -4.2 
Current account to GDP -2.8 -1.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.7 -4.4 -1.7 12.5 
Source: The National Statics of Korea 
The direct cause of the 1997 economic crisis was due to the government‟s failure to 
manage foreign exchange market. The government failed in managing the liquidity of foreign 
exchange and monitoring financial institutions. External liabilities increased more than 30% 
annually between 1994 and 1996 by introducing the liberalization policy of capital account. 
In 1996 and 1997, external liabilities rate to GDP exceeded 30%, while it was below 20% 
until 1994. The direct foreign loans of companies and the bank loans to lend money to 
companies occupied the majority of increased foreign debt. In particular, the portion of short-
term foreign debt was high and thus the possibility of foreign liquidity crisis was also high 
(Lee and Rhee, 2002). In the 1990s, the portion of short-term foreign debt among total 
external liabilities was over 50%, whereas foreign exchange reserves were far short of short-
term foreign debt. In general, if foreign payment ability index, calculated by the ratio of short-
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term foreign payment burden to foreign exchange reserves, is below 60%, the country‟s 
financial condition is regarded as stable, while 60-100% is cautious and over 100% is 
dangerous. In case of Korea, it was 280% in 1996. Relatively sound macroeconomic indices 
were concealing the structural weakness of risky foreign liquidity at the time. Table 2 shows 
the deteriorating foreign payment ability of Korea. 
Table 2: Changes in foreign payment ability in the 1990s 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total foreign payment burden 
(billion dollar) 
62.9 67.0 88.7 119.7 164.3 158.1 149.4 
Foreign payment burden to GDP 
(%) 
20.0 19.4 22.0 24.5 31.6 33.2 46.5 
Short-term foreign payment 
burden to total foreign payment 
burden (%) 
58.8 60.2 65.8 65.8 56.6 40.0 20.7 
Short-term foreign payment 
burden to foreign exchange 
reserves (%) 
215.7 198.9 227.5 240.6 279.8 309.8 59.2 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy 
2.2 The process of the 1997 Asian economic crisis 
The rapid reduction of foreign currency liquidity in 1997 was due to the withdrawal of 
international lenders and the government‟s provision of foreign currency to commercial banks 
to prevent their bankruptcies. A finish blow was the massive withdrawal of foreign currency 
from Korean financial market, that is, bank panic. Bank panic occurs when three elements - 
shortage of potential liquidity, final lender‟s passivity, and steep confidence decline - are 
satisfied simultaneously (Shin I., 1998). 
In the late 1990s, the overseas liquidity of Korean finance was aggravating due to the 
relaxed regulation on financial institutions, particularly on non-monetary institutions 
including merchant banks. Non-monetary institutions were under loose regulation, compared 
to commercial banks, in terms of BIS equity capital rate and interest rate. They were exposed 
to the risks of interest, foreign exchange and credit. While the rate of non-performing loans to 
equity capital was 12.2% in commercial banks, that of non-monetary institutions was 31.9% 
in 1996. In this way, the Korean government failed to properly manage the liquidity of foreign 
exchange market (Islam, 1998). Table 3 shows changes in the liquidity of foreign exchange 
market before the 1997 economic crisis. 
 
 
Table 3: Changes in foreign currency liquidity (billion dollar) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Foreign currency reserves 17.2 20.3 25.7 32.7 33.2 20.4 
Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking 
(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014 
ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8  Paper ID_D426 
 
5 
www.globalbizresearch.org 
Foreign asset 31.7 36.0 46.5 61.4 70.0 65.1 
Total foreign debt 
(Short-term foreign debt) 
42.8 
(18.5) 
43.9 
(19.2) 
56.8 
(30.4) 
78.4 
(45.3) 
104.7 
(61.0) 
120.8 
(51.2) 
Net foreign debt 11.1 7.9 10.3 16.9 34.7 55.7 
Source: adapted from Shin (1998).  
Meanwhile, international confidence in Korean financial institutions and business system 
greatly decreased by a series of company bankruptcies in 1997, including Hanbo Group, 
Sammi, Jinro, New Core, and Kia Motors. Until July 1997, 7 conglomerates, among 30 big 
conglomerates, were bankrupted consecutively, while more than half of 30 conglomerates 
recorded deficit in 1997. In basic, Korean companies were on the brink of high liquidity risk 
due to their high debt ratio and dependency on liability (Johnson, 1998). In 1997, the average 
debt ratio of Korean manufacturing companies was 396.3%, whereas that of American 
companies was 153.6%, Japanese companies 193.3%, and Taiwanese companies 85.7%. 
Making things worse, the profitability of Korean companies was low, increasing the 
possibility of bankruptcy. Trends in management indices in Table 4 simultaneously denote the 
risky situation of Korean companies and their successful restructuring after the economic 
crisis. 
Table 4:Trends in major management indices of Korean manufacturing companies (%) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Debt ratio 317.1 396.3 303.0 214.7 210.6 
Return on net sales 6.5 8.3 6.1 6.6 7.4 
Profit margin on sales 1.0 -0.3 -1.8 1.7 1.3 
Source: Bank of Korea (each year), An Analysis of Company Management. 
In particular, the ratio of profit margin on sales is very low, compared to the ratio of return 
on net sales. Even though Korean companies record high profit in sales activities, their non-
operating revenue is generally inferior due to their high burden of financial expenses resulting 
from high dependency on external debt. In 1999, while return on net sales and profit margin 
on sales of American companies were 7.7% and 8.6% respectively, those of Korean 
companies were 6.6% and 1.7% (Lee J., 2003). 
The business management behavior of big conglomerates was negative and irrational. 
While the average debt ratio of non-conglomerates was 257.9% between 1986 and 1996, that 
of 30 conglomerates was 346.3%. During the same period, the capital return rate of 30 
conglomerates recorded 2.4%, far below 3.9% of non-conglomerates. Accordingly, the high 
debt rate and low profitability of conglomerates reduced their ability to repay debt. 
Meanwhile, causes of conglomerates‟ unwholesome management were complex: over-
investment, inefficient support of affiliates like cross payment guarantee, and the unsolid 
governance system (Hahm abd Mishkin, 2000). In particular, the governing system of 
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conglomerates was very fragile, due to weak cross-checking system, power misuse by major 
shareholders, and unclear management of finance and auditing information. The prohibition 
of hostile M&A by foreigners made conglomerates irresponsive to external risk. Above all 
things, the government-led financial system was a key factor that led to irresponsible 
company management (Chung, 1999). The government-ruling banking system lost autonomy 
and could not supervise customer companies properly, causing the moral hazard of business 
owners. Under the government-ruling financial system, conglomerates expanded business 
lines recklessly through borrowed money and mutual guarantee between affiliated companies 
(Johnson, 1998). 
It is of course that international confidence in financial institutions that loaned money to 
insolvent companies downgraded seriously. Amidst of these financial and business situations, 
the financial crisis in Southeast Asia occurred in July 1997 with the nosedive of Thai Bat and 
it spread to Korea in November 1997. The stock market crashed and Korean money was 
devaluated sharply in foreign exchange market. International lenders doubted the capacity of 
Korea‟s debt return and began to withdraw loans in a lump, pushing unhealthy financial 
institutions to bankruptcy (Goldstein, 1998). The government poured foreign currency to 
support financial institutions, depleting foreign currency reserves. In the end, foreign 
exchange crisis, caused by bank panic, led to financial and business crises, and the Korean 
government asked the IMF for bail-out loan on November 21, 1997. 
In sum, the cause of the 1997 economic crisis was in vicious chain - big companies‟ debt-
ridden over-investment, declining profit and unreliability, the unprofitability of loaned money, 
and the decline of foreign lenders‟ confidence in Korean financial institutions and companies. 
This kind of unhealthy business management system was derived from the government-ruling 
financial system that was introduced to propel government-led compressed economic growth 
strategy. The government-led financial system showed structural limitations with the growth 
and complicatedness of economy. Even though the government had propelled financial de-
regulation policy, such as the privatization of commercial banks, since the late 1980s, the 
unhealthy custom of business management was unchanged. The governmental intervention in 
financial institutions continued, whereas the supervision over business owners was poorly 
established. In addition, the structural instability of international financial market and the 
government‟s inadequate responses brought about the massive withdrawal of foreign lenders 
and investors from Korean financial market, leading to the 1997 economic crisis. 
2.3 Policy responses to the 1997 Asian economic crisis 
The 1997 economic crisis devastated Korean economy in a blow. In November 1997, the 
total sum of available foreign reserves was just 3.9 billion dollar and stock market crashed, 
while foreign exchange rate skyrocketed. Against this miserable backdrop, the Kim Dae-jung 
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government changed the paradigm of economic policy from the government-led economy, 
characterized by protection and control, toward the market economy based on free 
competition and self-responsibility (Hong and Jang, 2006). As a method of deregulation, the 
Kim government opened domestic market fully to foreign investors, and changed the 
government‟s role from regulator to market supporter (Shin I., 1998). The government aimed 
to restructure financial institutions and business sector through the creative destruction of 
irrational customs. 
On the basis of this changed idea, the president-elect Kim Dae-jung led the process of 
overcoming the economic crisis even before his official inauguration. The government and 
IMF agreed several items as the precondition of providing bail-out funds, including austerity 
financial policy based on fiscal retrenchment and high interest rate, closure of insolvent 
financial institutions, introduction of tight supervision system, and the increase of labor 
market flexibility (Huh and Yoo, 2002). The government propelled economic restructuring 
and the liberalization of capital market in advance. The government totally permitted foreign 
investors the M&A against domestic companies and land acquisition. 
Meanwhile, for the realization of the IMF agreement and economy restructuring, sharing 
pains and burden was necessary between three subjects of the economy. As a way of reaching 
agreement, Kim led the establishment of the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC) on January 
15, 1998 and propelled the reform of the corporate governance system and the flexibility of 
labor market. Kim played a pivotal role in producing “the social compact to overcome 
economic crisis” in February 1998, composed of 90 items in 10 sectors (Kim and Jeon, 2002). 
Following the compact, labor-related laws were revised in February 2008 to introduce layoff 
system and dispatched work system. As a return, employment insurance coverage was 
extended greatly and measures to tackle unemployment, equivalent to 10 trillion won 
(approximately 10 billion US dollar at present), were taken. Also, the government and 
conglomerates agreed 5 items of business restructuring to abolish the arbitrariness of major 
shareholders (emperor-style management) and the indiscernible extension of conglomerates 
(line-item management). Table 5 shows the five items agreed between the president-elect and 
conglomerates. 
 
Table 5: Five items of agreement on business restructuring 
Five items Major contents 
Increasing the transparency of 
business management  
 
- Obligating the making of combined financial statements for 30 
conglomerates 
- Obligating the establishment of committee to select external 
auditors for listed companies 
- Obligating the selection of independent outside director for listed 
companies 
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Dissolution of cross payment 
guarantee 
- Prohibiting new cross guarantee between affiliated companies 
- Dissolution of existing cross payment guarantee by March 2000 
Improving financial structure - Disapproving reimbursements on the interest of excessive 
liabilities 
- Exempting gift tax in case of repaying debt through the disposal of 
real estate or shareholders‟ bestowed assets 
Concentrating company 
capacity on core business 
sector 
- Exempting corporate tax and gift tax in case of exchanging fixed 
assets between corporate bodies 
- Shortening the period needed in liquidating insolvent companies 
- Loosening regulation on foreigner‟s M & A 
Reinforcing the responsibility 
of major shareholders and 
managers 
- Loosening requirements for exercising minor shareholders‟ right, 
including representative lawsuit 
- Destructing shareholders‟ stocks with the responsibility of 
company bankruptcy 
Source: Huh and Yoo (2002). 
Following the agreement in the KTC, the government enforced the reform and 
restructuring of economy to a direction of reinforcing the free market economic system, in 
order to early graduate from the IMF bail-out system. Policy responses to the 1997 economic 
crisis were developed in four larger categories of financial, business, labor, and public sectors. 
2.4 Financial and foreign exchange policies 
The short-term goal of financial restructuring was to restore the capital intermediary 
function of financial institutions. In specific, the government prevented the domino effect of 
insolvent financial institutions and abolished market instability by wiping out insolvent 
financial institutions and bonds, and extended the equity capital of financial institutions 
through the concentrated support on commercial banks. Meanwhile, the medium and long-
term goal of financial restructuring was to restructure financial industry and establish market 
principle to a direction of strengthening the autonomous management of financial institutions, 
focusing on profitability, by abolishing the government-controlled finance, restructuring 
supervisory system, and improving the governance system of financial institutions (Baliño 
and Ubide, 1999) 
In order to push forward financial restructuring, the government established the 
“Restructuring Planning Board” in May 1998 under the Financial Supervisory Service. The 
Board classified financial institutions into two groups - survival and nonviable ones, and 
nonviable financial institutions were merged into robust financial institutions after clearing up 
non-performing loans. Public funds were given to surviving financial institutions to extend 
their equity capital. As a result, some large commercial banks were nationalized, while some 
were sold to foreign investors. The government introduced the timely correction system in 
December 1997 to obligate supervisory authorities to exercise correction order in case of 
being short of equity capital. Supervisory authorities were also obliged to order insolvent 
financial institutions to reduce their equity capital (Goldstein, 1998). 
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In accordance with these reformative institutions and criteria, the government liquidated 5 
commercial banks, which lacked the possibility of normalization, among 12 commercial 
banks with below 8% of BIS ratio, through the method of transferring assets and liabilities to 
sound commercial banks. Remained 7 banks were obliged to take intensive self-help effort, 
such as capital and staff reduction. Insolvent non-monetary financial institutions were also 
resolutely liquidated (Huh and Yoo, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the government set up 64 trillion won of public funds by 1999, and among 
them, 25 trillion won were injected in buying insolvent corporate bonds, 16 trillion won in 
supporting capital increase, and 9 trillion won in protecting savings. However, although the 
balance of insolvent corporate bonds of financial institutions were reduced from 136.3 trillion 
won June 1998 to 66.7 trillion won by the end of 1999, the amount of insolvent corporate 
bonds increased again due to the retarded implementation of business work-out programs, the 
bankruptcy of Daewoo Group, and the delayed sale of insolvent financial institutions (Hong 
and Jang, 2006). Accordingly, the government set up additional 32 trillion won of public 
funds in 2000, and total sum of public funds reached 104.6 trillion won by August 2000. In 
September 2000, the government raised additional 50 trillion won of public funds in order to 
propel the second round of financial market restructuring. 4 insolvent commercial banks 
(Hanbit, Pyounghwa, Gwangju, and Gyeongnam) were merged into Woori Finance Holdings, 
while Jeju Bank was annexed to Shinhan Bank. Non-monetary financial institutions were also 
liquidated by amalgamating small and medium-sized financial banks. Since the advent of the 
1997 economic crisis, the government had raised 155 trillion won of public funds by 
December 2002, and they were used for the following: 38.7 trillion won in buying insolvent 
corporate bonds owned by financial institutions, 60.2 trillion won in capital investment, 16.3 
trillion won in capital contribution, 25.8 trillion won in calculating the borrowings and 
savings of bankrupt financial institutions, and 14.3 trillion won in others. A majority of public 
funds were injected into banking sector. Among the total sum of 155 trillion won, 65.9% of 
129.5 trillion won (85.3 trillion won), except 25.8 trillion won of public funds that were used 
in calculating borrowings and savings, were used to buy insolvent corporate bonds of 
commercial banks. As a result, the number of financial institutions reduced by 28.8% and the 
number of employees in financial institutions reduced by 31.1% by 2002. Commercial banks 
decreased from 33 to 20, and the number of bank branches was reduced by 21.4%. Merchant 
banks were mostly liquidated, and more than half of mutual savings and finance companies 
were dissolved (Lee J., 2003). 
With regard to finance management system, four separate supervisory authorities were 
integrated to the Financial Supervisory Service, and separated it from the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy in order to terminate the government-ruling financial system. The 
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independency of central bank (Bank of Korea, BOK) was also greatly reinforced. Currency 
policy was ascribed to the sole authority of BOK, and BOK governor concurrently held the 
director of Monetary Policy Committee. The government also established the Financial 
Supervisory Commission under the Prime Minister‟ Office, as a collegiate supreme decision-
maker of financial policy and a supervisor of the Financial supervisory Service. 
Further, the government fostered finance-related institution. Criteria of prudential 
regulation on financial institutions were upgraded to global standard in order to prevent the 
possible insolvency of financial institutions in advance. Also, such institutions as outside 
director, supervisory committee, and legality inspector were introduced to improve the 
governance system of financial institutions. In case of commercial banks, the rate of outside 
directors should be more than half of total directors. The institutions of audit and information 
disclosure system were strengthened to improve the transparency of financial institutions. 
Table 6 summarizes the contents of financial market reform to tackle the 1997 economic crisis. 
Table 6: Items and contents of financial market restructuring 
Items Contents 
Strengthening management 
transparency 
- Strengthening the right of minority shareholders, such as representative 
lawsuit, and making easy the convocation of shareholders‟ general 
meeting 
Improving  the governance 
system 
- Burdening the obligation of introducing outside directors and audit and 
supervision committee 
- Strengthening the criteria of internal control and obligating the institution 
of legality inspectors 
Tightening prudent finance 
regulation 
- Obligating the establishment of the comprehensive risk management 
system 
- Prohibiting cross payment guarantee between affiliates of non-monetary 
financial institutions 
- Strengthening the prudent finance supervision criteria of specialized 
banks to a level of general commercial banks 
Strengthening audit and 
information disclosure systems 
- Introducing mark-to-market valuation on bonds affiliating to trust account 
- Introducing mark-to-market valuation on commercial securities 
- Introducing quarterly publication system on management performance 
Source: Huh and Yoo (2002). 
 
2.5 Business and industrial policies 
The ultimate goal of business restructuring was to reduce market uncertainty by 
liquidating insolvent companies and to improve the corporate governance system. Big 
conglomerates reached the agreement of finance restructuring with the government to enforce 
capital increase, the separation of affiliated companies, and disposal of assets to lower debt 
ratio under 200%, while middle-level conglomerates with high debt ratio became a target of 
work-out. Besides, the government strengthened market function by activating legal 
management and composition, improving information disclosure, upgrading audit 
transparency, strengthening the right of minority shareholders, and inducing direct foreign 
investment (Chung, 1999). 
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In specific, the liquidation of insolvent companies followed two tracks in accordance with 
the evaluation by credit banks: while recoverable companies would go through work-out, 
irrecoverable companies would be dissolved through merger, sale, and liquidation. The 
Financial Supervisory Commission publicized 55 liquidation companies in June 1998. 
Between July 1998 and June 1999, recoverable 76 companies among 325 insolvent 
companies affiliated to big and medium-sized conglomerates underwent work-out through the 
debt-for-equity swap of loans under the condition of self-effort such as asset sale, capital 
increase, and contribution of private property. Remained 249 companies were liquidated 
through sale, merger, liquidation, legal management. Daewoo Group, the fourth largest 
conglomerate, was liquidated at the time. Table 7 is the liquidation plan of insolvent 
companies. 
Table 7: Liquidation plan of insolvent big companies (in June 1999) 
 Target 
companies 
Existence Work-out Liquidation 
Affiliates of 15 
conglomerates 
248 12 38 198 (78) 
medium-sized 
conglomerates 
106 17 38 51 (17) 
Total 354 29 76 249 (96) 
Source, Financial Supervisory Commission (1999). 
(  ) is the number of companies liquidated by June 1999 
Further, the government and business agreed 3 additional supplementary items - 
strengthening prudent finance supervision in managing assets, regulating cross-shareholding 
between affiliated companies and prohibiting illegal internal transaction, and prohibiting 
irregular inheritance and bestowment - in order to supplement the missing points in the 
process of implementing the previously agreed five principles of business restructuring. 
The government established the “Public Fund Management Committee” under the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy, to supervise the use of public funds, and adopted “least 
cost principle” to minimize the waste of public funds. But in some cases public funds were 
wasted without objective rationale because of the pressure from trade unions. The government 
also took diverse measures to solidify the business management system. The government 
reached agreement with companies to lower the debt rate of conglomerates‟ affiliates under 
200% and prohibited the new cross payment guarantee between affiliates of the same mother 
company, while terminating existing cross payment guarantee (Financial Supervisory 
Commission, 1999). 
Diverse measures to establish transparent and responsible management system were also 
introduced. Outside director institution was introduced, obligating more than half of whole 
directors for big listed companies and more than a quarter for ordinary listed companies. In 
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order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, the government introduced the 
concentrated voting system, enabling minority shareholders to select their representatives as 
directors, and shareholder derivative lawsuit for minority shareholders. Requirements to 
recommend outside directors by minority shareholders were also loosened. Meanwhile, audit 
criteria was strengthened to comply with international standard and penalty on poor auditing 
and inspection was tightened. Companies were obligated to use consolidated financial 
statements in order for outsiders to easily understand the cash flow of big companies (Huh 
and Yoo, 2002; Hong and Jang, 2006). Table 8 states the contents of business restructuring. 
Table 8: Items and contents of business restructuring 
Items Main contents 
Increasing the transparency of 
business management 
- Permit financial institutions‟ trust account stocks to 
exercise decision power 
- Obligate companies to make quarterly report 
- Introduce supervision and audit committee 
- Obligate the appointment of non-executive directors 
- Introduce the concentrated vote system in selecting 
non-executive directors 
Liquidating cross payment 
guarantee 
- Prohibit financial institutions from demanding cross 
payment guarantee 
Improving financial structure - Loosen the limitation of financial institutions‟ debt-for-
equity swap 
- Found the business restructuring fund 
Strengthening the 
responsibility of major 
shareholders and managers 
- Regard major shareholders who substantially play the 
role of directorship as a director 
- Introduce the share retirement of major shareholders 
who have responsibility of company liquidation 
Limiting cross-shareholding - Introduce ceiling on total amount of shareholding 
Prohibiting the illegal internal 
transaction between affiliates 
- Obligate the publication of large-scale internal 
transaction 
- Strengthen regulation on illegal internal transaction 
Prohibiting irregular 
inheritance and bestowment 
- Tax the profit-taking from the stock market listing of 
unlisted stocks 
- Impose 20-40% of transfer tax in proportion to holding 
period when major shareholders transact their shares 
 Source: Huh and Yoo (2002). 
While business restructuring was successful in general, credit crunch of some big 
companies began from 2000 due to the weakened propulsion of restructuring and the delay of 
liquidating insolvent companies. To tackle this situation, the government started the second 
round of business restructuring by liquidating 52 insolvent companies among 287 companies 
with credit risk. In February 2001, the government introduced the regular evaluation system 
on the credit risk of companies and obliged creditor banks to evaluate credit risk twice per 
year. 
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2.6 Labor policy 
According Booz Allen & Hamilton report (1997), Korean companies‟ employment of 
redundant labor forces reached 9% of total employees, and the rigidity of labor market was a 
great barrier to competitiveness. Unemployed population increased from 450 thousands in 
October 1997 to 1,230 thousands in February 1998, whereas social safety net was fragile. 
Accordingly, urgent tasks for labor reform were to increase the flexibility of labor market, 
establish robust social safety net, and tackle the high level of unemployment. Moreover, 
making labor market flexible was a necessary prerequisite for financial and business 
restructuring (Kim and Jeon, 2002). 
The agreement to propel labor restructuring was made in the Korean Tripartite 
Commission (KTC) in February 1998 in which representatives from government, labor, 
business, and political participated. The KTC decided to introduce layoff system and labor 
dispatch system, and as an exchange, the government established the employment fund and 
permitted the political activities of trade unions. Teachers‟ labor union was legalized. The 
government also extended public job stability facilities, including Job Center, from 53 in 1997 
to 191 in 2001. Owing to labor market flexibility policy, the rate of casual and day workers to 
total wage workers increased from 45.9% in 1997 to 52.4% in 2000, whereas the rate of 
companies adopting annual salary system jumped from 3.6% in 1997 to 27.1% in 2000. 
The government publicized the “Comprehensive Measures to Tackle Unemployment” in 
March 1998 and increased workfare financial support and vocational training. A large amount 
of budget were allotted to public workfare programs to provide the poor unemployed with 
short-term jobs:  925.2 billion won in 1998, 2.3 trillion won in 1999, and 1.5 trillion won in 
2000. The coverage of unemployment insurance was extended in October 1998, to include the 
whole workplaces, while the previous coverage was limited to workplaces with 30 workers or 
more, as a way of extending the social safety net. Consequently, the amount of unemployment 
benefit increased from 799.2 billion won in 1998 to 936.2 billion won in 1999. Further, the 
government substituted the Livelihood Protection Act to the National Basic Livelihood Act, in 
order to extend the coverage and benefits of welfare recipients and reinforce workfare liking 
welfare provision and obligation to work. 
As a result of labor restructuring, labor mobility rate, a sum of recruitment rate and 
turnover rate greatly increased from around 30% in 1997 to 50% in 1999. The main method 
of recruitment also changed from beginners-centered recruitment to career staff-centered one. 
The rate of career recruitment among total recruitment increased around 25% in 1997 to 55.7% 
in 2000 (Kim and Jeon, 2002).  
However, along with economic recovery, the agreement on labor market reform became 
invalidated, and trade unions seceded from the KTC, intensifying the labor-management 
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conflict. According to IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2001), international 
competitiveness of Korea‟s labor relation in 2001 ranked 46 among 49 countries surveyed. 
2.7 Public sector reform 
The goal of public sector reform was to establish small but efficient government and for 
the aim the new public management reform was propelled. The government intended to 
realize small government by restructuring government organizations, reducing government 
staff, and privatizing public enterprises. The executive agency system and open recruitment 
system were introduced to modernize government management system. Customer-centered 
provision of public services and the establishment of electronic government were also 
emphasized as a way of public sector reform. 
In specific, with regard to the downsizing of public sector, 140 thousand public sector 
employees, equivalent to 20% of total 700 thousand employees (except school teachers and 
police persons), were reduced between 1998 and 2001. They were 22.4 thousand employees 
in central government, 56.6housand employees in local government, 41.7 thousand 
employees in public enterprises, and 19.6 thousand employees in affiliated organizations. 
However, while the reduction rate of public officials in general services was 8.2%, those of 
public officials in technical services and labor services were 22.5% and 56.5% respectively. 
132 government positions, among 732 high-level positions (higher than bureau director grade) 
of central government departments, were designated as open recruitment positions that public 
officials and private professionals compete for positions, as a way of strengthening 
competition and performance-based management of the public sector. By January 2002, the 
government recruited 117 positions through open recruitment system, but just 15 positions 
were occupied by civilian competitors. The government also designated 23 governmental 
agencies with enterprise characteristics as executive agencies, and recruited their directors 
through open competition. While directors have a great deal of autonomy in managing 
executive agencies, they should burden the responsibility on the performance of agencies. 
The government also selected 11 public enterprises, among 24 public enterprises, as 
targets of privatization in 1998. Also, performance-based management system, such as annual 
salary system and s60 degree evaluation system, was introduced to renovate the internal 
management of public enterprises. 
Preparatory validity examination system was introduced targeting public programs that 
needed more than 50 billion won of budget, and tried to scientific budget compilation based 
on benefit-cost analysis. The government also established electronic government as an 
infrastructure for open government. The general public could enjoy electronic civil 
application service at home or workplaces through “Government for Customers (G4C)” 
system. Through the establishment of electronic procurement system (Government to 
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Business, G2B) between the government and want-be companies, application for government 
procurement became possible through on-line system, greatly increasing the transparency of 
procurement. Applicants could acquire relevant information through on-line services, without 
directly contacting with public officials. In addition, the government established high-speedy 
electronic network system and electronic approval system. 
Owing to timely and appropriate policy responses to the 1997 Asian economic crisis, 
Korea successfully overcame insolvency. While usable foreign currency reserve was just 3.9 
billion dollars in November 1997 when Korea asked for the IMF bailout fund, it increased to 
39.3 billion dollar in July 1998. The rate of short-term foreign debt to total foreign debt 
decreased from 44.3% in December 1997 to 26.1% in May 1998. Foreign exchange rate 
against the US dollar decreased from 1,573 won in December 1997 to 1,236 won in July 1998, 
whereas the return rate of corporate bonds fell from 29.0% to 12.3% during the same period. 
Korea graduated from economic insolvency early enough by paying back the IMF bail-out 
loans within a given period (Haggard and Mo, 2000). 
3. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and Policy Responses 
3.1 Background of the 2008 global financial crisis 
The 2008 global financial crisis began with the crisis of domino bankruptcy of global 
banking institutions caused by the insolvency of sub-prime housing mortgage loan. The 
impact of global financial crisis was not limited to the financial sector but spread to the real 
economy sector, causing the accompanied recession of global economy. While the global 
financial crisis was arisen from complex causes, decisive factors were low-interest policy of 
the United States, global imbalance, the excessive expansion of financial derivatives and the 
underestimation of their risks, the moral hazard of economic subjects, and the limitation of 
financial supervisory authorities (Crotty, 2009).  
In specific, the U.S. Federal Reserve had maintained low-interest policy to tackle 
economic depression caused by the IT bubble in the early 2000s. Policy interest rate was 
lowered from 6.5% in 2001 to 1.0% in 2004. While low-interest policy was effective in 
overcoming economic slump, it contributed to increasing the debt ratio of financial 
institutions, making financial institutions pursue excessive risk, and rising housing price by 
extending mortgage-related credit (Frank and Hesse, 2009). 
Global imbalance is the trade imbalance between the US trade deficit and the trade 
surplus of favorable trade balance countries, such as China and Japan. Trade deficit of the US 
reached 6% of GDP in 2006, increasing the liquidity of American dollars in international 
financial market. Overflowing dollars were invested in the safety assets of the US, like US 
government bonds, lowering interest rate further. Investment banks began to invest in 
housing-mortgage related financial items, activating sub-prime mortgage loan (Borio and 
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Disyatat, 2011). 
Financial derivatives widely spread housing market-related risk to investors. Investors 
could not acknowledge their potential risk because of the lengthy and complicated process of 
derivatives‟ distribution structure. Accordingly, excessive investment was made to financial 
derivatives and increased risks. 
The moral hazard of householders, financial institutions and credit-rating agencies was 
also one of key causes of the global financial crisis. Householders borrowed money 
excessively with the expectation of housing price rise, whereas financial institutions were 
obsessed with short-term profits. The complicating loan conditions stimulated risk-seeking 
behaviors of borrowers and financial institutions. Credit-rating institutions did not play a role 
of appropriate evaluator on financial institutions and mortgage-related companies (Pooran, 
2010). 
A huge sum of lobby funds was put into politicians and bureaucrats to alleviate financial 
regulation. 2.7 billion dollar of lobby funds were used officially in the financial sector 
between 1999 and 2008. Under this situation, financial supervisory authorities failed to 
properly evaluate the risk concentration of financial institutions. 
3.2 Domestic spillover of the 2008 global financial crisis  
The insolvency of sub-prime mortgage began in earnest by the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. The domino bankruptcy and insolvency of financial institutions 
greatly strengthened the preference for safety assets and liquidity security, blocking whole 
financial market. In particular, the financial institutions of advanced countries had extended 
liquidity security and de-leveraging since June 2008 and this accelerated capital outflow in 
emerging financial market, spreading financial crisis globally. Again, financial crisis spread 
to real economy and caused the recession of global economy (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009).  
Since September 2008 the world economy had recorded minus growth rate for the first 
time after World War II. While the US and Euro economic zone turned into minus growth 
since the third quarter of 2008, emerging economy also experienced the sharp fall of 
economic growth due to the difficulty in capital finance and export slowdown. The growth 
rate of international trade decreased from 7.4% in 2007 to 2.9% in 2008 due to sluggish 
demand, monetary stringency, and the extension of foreign exchange fluctuation. 
The global financial crisis gave domestic financial market a shock. Interest rate, stock 
price, and exchange rate were all fluctuated and credit crunch was deepened. In foreign 
exchange market, won-dollar exchange rate was depreciated 38.9% during 3 months from 
August 2008 to November 2008, recording 1,513 won on 24 November. The fluctuation of 
exchange rate was also greatly extended, adding the instability of foreign exchange market. 
KOSPI index in stock market recorded the lowest on 24 October. Stock price tumbled from 
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the highest in May 2008 (1,888) to 938.7 in October 2008. Short-term market interest rate 
rose steeply around bank bonds and corporate bonds. Financial institutions evaded credit 
offering to low-rating householders and companies, causing credit crunch in the financial 
market. 
The instability of financial market had a great impact on real economy. Retail sales 
decreased by 1.8% in September and by 3.3% in October 2008 respectively, and equipment 
investment decreased by 2.4%, compared to last month. In November 2008, export volume 
recorded 15.6% decrease, while manufacturing production decreased by 14.2% and service 
industry production dropped by 0.9%. As a result, the GDP growth rate of the fourth quarter 
of 2008 decreased by 3.3% compared to the same period in the previous year and decreased 
by 4.6% compared to the previous quarter, for the first time since the IMF economic crisis in 
1998. The yearly GDP growth rate recorded 2.3%, the lowest record after recording -5.7% 
growth rate in 1998. Employment and wage level were also deteriorated greatly. While the 
number of new employees increased by 160 thousands in August 2008, compared to the same 
month of the previous year, it decreased by 10 thousands in December 2008. The increasing 
rate of real wage fell 2.7% in the third quarter and further dropped 6.4% in the fourth quarter. 
Financial and proprietary accounts were also flowed by 1.3billion dollars in September and 
3.6 billion dollars in October 2006, due to the massive repayment of foreign loans by 
financial institutions. Meanwhile, current account recorded 4.98 billion dollars of surplus in 
October 2008 owing to the drop of imported oil price and decrease in product import. 
Consumer price was stabilized by the fall of imported raw materials price, caused by 
international economic depression.  
The 2008 global financial crisis revealed the weakness of Korean economy once more. 
Short-term foreign debt reached 190 billion dollars in the third quarter of 2008. Among them, 
the short-term debt of commercial banks occupied 160 billion dollars. The loan structure of 
commercial banks was unhealthy, as shown by 130% of loan-deposit ratio in 2008. Export-led 
economy was deteriorating in 2008 by recording 3.7 billion dollars deficit of current account 
and 2.5 billion dollars trade deficit in August 2008 (Global Financial Crisis Compilation 
Committee, 2012). 
3.3 Policy responses to the 2008 Global financial crisis 
3.3.1 Fiscal and tax policies 
The Lee Myung-bak government (2008-2012) enforced expansionary fiscal policy such 
as the increase of fiscal expenditure and taxation support, along with monetary policy 
including interest rate reduction. Starting with 10 trillion won of compiling a revised budget 
in November 2008, the government drafted 28.9 trillion won of a revised supplementary 
budget in April 2009 focusing on stabilizing the livelihoods of the public and job creation and 
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maintenance. With regard to the use of a revised budget, 4.6 trillion won was distributed in 
extending SOC programs, 3.4 trillion won in supporting small and medium-sized companies, 
1.0 trillion won in supporting low income bracket, and etc. Among a revised supplementary 
budget of 2009, over 12 trillion won were used in supporting the livelihoods of the public and 
job creation, including 4.2 trillion won in stabilizing the livelihoods of low income bracket, 
3.5 trillion won in extending job maintenance and job opportunity, 4.5 trillion won in 
supporting small and medium-sized companies and self-employed small business owner. 
However, while the government put an emphasis on stably managing fiscal sustainability 
from 2010, taking into account the weakened fiscal conditions in the process of overcoming 
the global financial crisis, financial resources were distributed to social welfare and job 
creation on the preferential basis. In 2010 budget, welfare expenditure increased by 8.9%, 
compared to the previous year, and its ratio to total expenditure occupied 27.7%, recording an 
all-time high. 
Concurrently, the government promoted the early execution of budget in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy. In 2009, 60.6% of annual budget 
was implemented during the first half of the year. In particular, the government implemented 
77.2% of budget in creating jobs and tackling unemployment in the first half of 2009. Also, 
the government strengthened the supervision on budget implementation and established field-
centered management system of budget. The early execution of budget continued in 2010 by 
implementing 61.0% of annual budget in the first half of the year.       
This expansionary policy contributed to the recovery of economy from 2009. Economic 
growth rate changed to plus (+0.2%) in the first quarter of 2008, compared to the former 
quarter, and maintained growth trends stably by recording 2.5% in the second quarter and 3.2% 
in the third quarter. The annual economic growth rate accomplished plus figure (0.2%) in 
2009, due to timely policy responses and growth economy in emerging market. 
With regard to tax policy responses, the government carried out tax system reform to a 
direction of reducing tax burden, in order to boost the economy. In 2008, the government 
lowered the rate of composite income tax to till 2% gradually to stabilize the livelihoods of 
middle and low income bracket and to stimulate domestic consumption. Corporate income tax 
rate was also lowered to stimulate investment, and the object of tax reduction was extended to 
support small and medium-sized companies. The government also facilitated R&D 
investment of the private sector. The rate of comprehensive real estate tax was also lowered. 
Further, the government established 10 trillion won of comprehensive measures to tackle high 
oil prices, as a way of preventing the shrinking of domestic demand and the possibility of 
inflation. In 2009, the government increased tax support, including reducing the transfer gain 
tax of real estate. Tax support for overseas funds was also strengthened. Tax support for 
Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking 
(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014 
ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8  Paper ID_D426 
 
19 
www.globalbizresearch.org 
alternating overage cars was introduced to recover the domestic sale of vehicles and reduce 
air pollution. 
3.3.2 Monetary and foreign exchange policies 
BOK lowered benchmark interest rate by 3.25 points through six times between October 
2008 and February 2009. As a result, benchmark interest rate became 2.0%, the lowest since 
May 1999. BOK also extended the credit supply capacity of financial institutions, by 
providing 18.5 trillion won of liquidity. In order to improve the financial conditions of small 
and medium-sized companies, BOK increased the total amount of loan ceiling scale to 10 
trillion won, and lowered its interest rate to 1.25%. Due to the reduction of benchmark 
interest rate, both corporate and government bonds fell sharply. With BOK‟s extended supply 
of credit to financial institutions, the loan amount of small and medium-sized companies and 
householders also increased, and small companies could borrow money form commercial 
banks with favorable condition by ultra-cheap money policy and government guarantee. In 
stock market, KOSPI index recovered the previous level before the global financial crisis by 
recording 1,400 in May 2009. Owing to active policy responses, Korean economy began to 
recover from mid-2009. While GDP growth rate recorded -4.6% in the fourth quarter of 2008 
and 0.1% in the first quarter of 2009, compared to the previous quarter, it recorded 2.5% 
increase in the second quarter and 3.4% increase in the third quarter of 2009 respectively. 
The government introduced diverse measures to stabilize stock market. The KOSPI index, 
which reached 2,000 in October 2007, slumped to below 1,000 in October 2008, just for a 
year. On 24 October 2008, KOSPI dropped 10.6% in a day, recording 938.7. Against this 
backdrop, financial authorities prohibited short stock selling temporarily and extended the 
limit of daily purchase of treasury stock. In November 2008, 515 billion won of stock market 
stability fund was established to cope with the increasing stock sale of foreign investors.  
The government established 10 trillion won of bond market stability fund to resolve 
companies‟ difficulties in fundraising. The fund purchased, by priority, the corporate bond of 
blue-chip companies that was undergoing temporal liquidity crisis. The government also 
improved the supervisory system on derivative security market to a direction of better 
protecting investors, containing the system risk of financial institutions derived from 
derivative securities transaction, and restructuring the supervisory and monitoring system on 
derivative market. Moreover, the government increased twice the limit of total loans to relieve 
the financial difficulties of small and medium-sized companies. BOK provided 2.3 trillion 
won of subsidy to securities companies and 2.0 trillion won to non-monetary institutions. 
With regard to stabilizing foreign exchange market, the government signed a currency 
swap agreement with the United States, China, and Japan, while extending foreign currency 
liquidity in October 2008. Financial authority concluded 30 billion dollars contract with the 
Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking 
(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014 
ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8  Paper ID_D426 
 
20 
www.globalbizresearch.org 
US Federal Reserve in October 2008 and provided 16.4 billion dollars of liquidity by January 
2009. In December 2008 the government agreed the 38 trillion won of currency swap with 
People‟s Bank of China and extended the swap scale to 20 billion dollars with Bank of Japan. 
Owing to these currency swaps, won-dollar exchange rate, which recorded the highest 1,468 
on 28 October 2008, fell to 1,260 by the end of 2008. The government publicized the plan to 
provide 85 billion dollars of foreign currency liquidity during the fourth quarter of 2008 and 
provided 56.8 billion dollars of liquidity until February 2009. The government provided 
payment guarantee on foreign liabilities to support the foreign currency liquidity of financial 
institutions.  
Thanks to these efforts, the liquidity and loan structure of foreign currency were greatly 
improved by 2009. Korea secured 16.3 billion dollars of foreign currency liquidity in 2009 
and the ratio of medium and long-term foreign currency loan occupied 76.6%, greatly 
exceeding 52.4% of a target figure. Further, commercial banks were forced to improve the 
prudent finance supervision on foreign currency. The government establish “management 
criteria of the liquidity risk of foreign currency” to make financial institutions establish the 
internal control system on foreign currency management, and founded “management criteria 
of derivatives securities transaction risk” to curb financial institutions‟ excessive futures 
trading of foreign currency. The government also toughened regulation on short-term foreign 
currency loan and unnecessary foreign currency demand of financial institutions as a way of 
soundly managing the foreign currency account of commercial banks. The government 
launched “advertising team for Korean economy” and held briefing sessions to make public 
the integrity of Korean economy, targeting international economic analysts and credit-rating 
agencies. 
3.3.3 Reform of financial institutions and business 
With regard to the restructuring of financial institutions, the government supported the 
asset soundness and capital expansion of financial institutions by recommending them to 
expand equity capital through capital increase and internal reserve. Accordingly, the capital 
accounts of commercial banks increased by 16.2 trillion won and their BIS ratio recovered the 
previous level by December 2008, by recording 12.3%. The government also participated in 
increasing the capital stocks of commercial banks by 5.4 trillion won to supply additional 
liquidity to customer companies. 20 trillion won of “bank capital expansion fund” was 
established to extend the loan capacity of commercial banks, the fund supplied 12.3 trillion 
won to commercial banks in May 2009. 
The government established 20 trillion won of “restructuring fund” in 2009 to take over 
the non-performing loans of financial institutions and the assets of insolvent companies. The 
actual implementation amount was 4.4trillion won from its inception in June 2009 to 2010. 
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Table 9 shows the detailed statement of the uses of the restructuring fund.  
Table 9: The uses of restructuring fund (billion won) 
 2009 2010  
 
Total 
Non-
performin
g loan 
disposal 
Capital 
investmen
t 
Sub-
total 
Non-
performin
g loan 
disposal 
Capital 
investmen
t 
Sub-
total 
Financial 
restructurin
g 
828.1 0.5 828.6 3,184.7 0.4 3,185.
1 
4,013.
7 
Business 
restructurin
g 
- 238.1 238.1 - 179.7 179.7 417.8 
Total 828.1 238.6 1,066.
7 
3,184.7 180.1 3,364.
8 
4,431.
5 
Source: Global Financial Crisis Compilation Committee (2012). 
Regarding business restructuring, the government suggested financial institutions the 
direction for effective business restructuring and made financial institutions play a pivotal 
role in restructuring the business sector. To support business restructuring, the government 
established “support team for business restructuring” in November 2008, and obliged the 
team to plan the general direction of business restructuring and coordinate related 
departments. The team publicized the direction to propel business restructuring in December 
2008, focusing on main creditor bank-led restructuring. Following the proposed direction, 
creditor banks played a key role in restructuring business. Creditor banks classified customer 
companies into four groups through credit risk evaluation, and propelled restructuring of low-
graded insolvent companies, such as work-out and liquidation. Creditor banks-led business 
restructuring implemented differentiation strategy according to industrial classification and 
business scale. By industrial classification, restructuring was focused on the industries 
sensitive to economic ups and downs, such as construction industry and shipping industry. In 
terms of business scale, big companies were recommended to propel self-effort to improve 
financial structure following financial restructuring contract which made between creditor 
banks and big companies. In case of small and medium companies, creditor banks selected 
the target of restructuring through separate credit risk evaluation. Also, the government 
implemented “Fast-Track Program” to support small and medium companies that 
apprehended to be a bankruptcy in black.  
3.3.4 Labor and welfare policies 
Coping with economic difficulty, government departments was transformed into the 
emergency economic system to handle the crisis swiftly and department-widely. The 
government established the president-presiding “Emergency Economy Council,” which 
involved government departments, business sector, and private professionals. The Council 
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was held 70 times until September 2010. The “Crisis Management Council” was also formed 
in 2008 to support the Emergency Economy Council and manage high oil price. 
Social policy responses to economic crisis focused on supporting job creation. The 
function of Job Center was extended to strengthen job support to the socially disadvantaged. 
For unemployed young persons, “youth internship program” was inaugurated to extend the 
job opportunity of young persons and the “New Start Project” was introduced as a tailored 
employment support program for the young. The government also extended wage peak 
institution to promote the employment of the elderly, and provided the elderly with 
inducements for working such as deferred retirement and cash bounty. Further, the 
government promoted women‟s job opportunity by encouraging companies to introduce 
diverse measures such as part-time working, home working, and work-family coexistence 
programs. In particular, the government reinforced the support for service industry with high 
effect of employment inducement, including reducing the regulation on business start-up. 
Meanwhile, the government directly provided public jobs through financial subsidy. In 
March 2009, the government implemented job-related budget early enough and drew up a 
revised supplementary budget for job creation. Through the budget, the government planned 
to provide 800 thousand public jobs to the disadvantaged and unemployed, including 166 
thousands of social service jobs and 250 thousands of “Hope Reborn Project” for low-income 
bracket. The government also initiated “job-sharing movement” to minimize job reduction in 
the private sector. The government encouraged employers and employees to participate in 
job-sharing by subsidizing job maintenance in workplaces. In order to promote labor morale, 
the government introduced employment grant program and professional internship program 
for unemployed natural sciences professionals. Tax reduction was also provided to small and 
medium companies that employed new workforces. Furthermore, as long-term measures, the 
government propelled the increase of labor market flexibility by activating flexible work 
arrangement, wage peak system, performance-based incentive system, and flexible working 
hour system. The government also activated short-term working for work-family coexistence 
and introduced programs to support career discontinuation women. 
With regard to the welfare of ordinary citizens, the government made efforts to stabilize 
real estate market, expand the provision of small loan finance, and consolidate the social 
safety net. In specific, the government increased the supply of long-term public rental housing 
to support the housing welfare of low-income bracket and induced the reduction of house sale 
prices by putting the upper price limit on newly parcel-out apartments. In September 2008, 
the government announced to build large amount of low-price, small-sized apartments to 
support houseless people. The National Housing Fund provided 5.9 trillion won of low-
interest loans to reduce the housing expenses of houseless people. The government also 
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founded the Credit Recovery Fund to relieve the difficulties of low credit rating persons and 
carried out debt restructuring for credit defaulters. The Microfinance Foundation supported 
credit recovery of low income bracket by providing them with start-up, employment, and 
livelihood stabilization finances. The government also increased public workfare programs to 
encourage low income bracket to participate in labor. 
Welfare provision for the disadvantaged was extended to save the people suffering from 
economic crisis. The Basic Senior Pensions Allowance was introduced to support the poor 
elderly and the benefit of the Basic Livelihood Security was increased to promote the self-
help of low income bracket. Pension allowance for the disabled was also introduced to 
support the economic self-help of the severely disabled. Social welfare budget increased by 
8.9% in 2010, compared to the previous year, in order to consolidate the social safety net for 
the disadvantaged and low income bracket. In 2011, social welfare budget reached 86.4 
trillion won, occupying 28.0% of total government expenditures and 7.0% of GDP. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Up to till, this paper reviewed the causes and process of the economic crises in 1997 and 
2008, and examined in what ways did Korea overcome the crises successfully. In general, in 
case of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the government did not preemptively respond to 
possible economic crisis by failing to properly manage foreign exchange market and 
supervise financial institutions. Big conglomerates were financially vulnerable and indulged 
in moral hazard. Labor market was rigid, while trade unions were militant. Under these 
circumstances, export-oriented Korean economy was very vulnerable to economic fluctuation 
from outside and the Asian foreign exchange crisis in 1997 devastated Korea. Confronted 
with economic insolvency, the Kim Young-sam government (1993-1997) applied to the IMF 
for a bailout in November 1997 and accepted all guidelines the IMF set in return for offering 
bailout loan. 
The president-elect Kim Dae-jung led the process of bailout negotiation and initiated 
policies to tackle the economic crisis, instead of lame-duck receding president. In terms of 
politics, the Kim Dae-jung government was regarded liberal and progressive, compared to 
previous conservative governments. The Kim government founded a tripartite commission, 
consisted of government, labor, business, and major political parties, as a vehicle of tackling 
the economic crisis. The tripartite commission successfully forged measures to meet 
economic crisis, and the government was also successful in implementing agreed policies. 
While trade unions were cooperative with progressive-minded Kim Dae-jung for a long while, 
the Kim government in the early stage of power could lead business and financial institutions. 
Even though business restructuring followed the formality of autonomous agreement between 
the government and business, business owners had no choice to follow government policies. 
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The government-mediated “big deal” project, the business items exchange between big 
conglomerates, was an example. Financial institutions had been under the strong influence of 
the government at the time. Accordingly, the Kim government could lead restructuring 
policies and was in a favorable position in persuading the active participation of the parties 
concerned. 
Above all else, social consensus for mutual concession was agreed on the edge of cliff. 
The general public willingly shared pains in the process of restructuring the economy. A 
model example was the massive participation of the general public in nationwide “gold 
colleting movement”. Under these circumstances, the Kim government implemented diverse 
policies timely and adequately to restructure financial institutions, labor market, business, and 
public sector. As a result, Korea succeeded in overcoming the economic crisis in a short 
period of time. While the financial structure and governance system of commercial banks 
became greatly sound, the transparency of business management greatly improved. Foreign 
exchange market was stabilized with increase of foreign currency reserves. 
Meanwhile, the causes of the 2008 global financial crisis were more exogenous and 
global, whereas those of the 1997 economic crisis were generally immanent and contained to 
Asian countries. The 2008 crisis was triggered by the insolvency of sub-prime mortgage loans 
in the US and the domino bankruptcy of global banking institutions in advanced countries. 
Global financial institutions drained US dollars from emerging financial markets including 
Korea, to secure financial liquidity and de-leveraging, and eventually spread financial crisis 
globally. Korea could not be an exception. Since the fourth quarter of 2008, Korean financial 
market had plunged in terms of interest rate, stock price, and exchange rate, and the instability 
of financial market had a great impact on real economy. The 2008 global financial crisis 
revealed the weakness of Korean economy once again. 
Against this backdrop, the Lee Myung-bak government tackled the crisis by mobilizing 
diverse measures simultaneously. In terms of fiscal and tax policies, the Lee government 
implemented expansionary fiscal policy such as the increase of fiscal expenditure and 
taxation support. The government increased government expenditure and promoted early 
execution of budget as a pump-priming policy. Tax exemption and tax support were also 
greatly extended to boost domestic investment and consumption. 
With regard to monetary and foreign exchange policy responses, the Lee government 
lowered benchmark interest rate by a great deal to activate economy, and supplied liquidity to 
financial institutions to extend their credit supply capacity. Thanks to lowered interest rate, 
companies could raise funds more easily. The government also took measures to stabilize 
stock and bond markets. The supervisory system on derivative security market was improved. 
Regarding foreign exchange policy, the government signed currency swap agreement with the 
Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking 
(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014 
ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8  Paper ID_D426 
 
25 
www.globalbizresearch.org 
United States, China, and Japan, and provided commercial banks with foreign currency to 
increase liquidity. Some institutions were also established to supervise commercial banks‟ 
liquidity risk of foreign currency. 
The Lee government carried out the restructuring of financial institutions and business 
sector. The government motivated financial institutions to expand equity capital through 
capital increase and internal reserve. Restructuring fund was established to take over the non-
performing loans of financial institutions and the assets of insolvent companies. Regarding 
business restructuring, the government made commercial banks play a key role in 
restructuring business sector. Following this proposal, creditor banks classified customer 
companies into four groups through credit risk evaluation, and propelled restructuring of low-
graded insolvent companies. Creditor banks made financial restructuring contract with big 
companies. 
Employment and welfare policies were also necessary to tackle the economic crisis. 
Employment policy focused on supporting job creation. For the aim, the Lee government 
enforced diverse measures to support job creation for the young, the elderly, the poor, and the 
disabled. The government also reinforced the support for service industry with high effect of 
employment inducement. Further, the government directly provided public jobs through 
financial subsidy and implemented job-related budget early enough. “Job-sharing movement” 
was initiated to minimize job reduction. The government encouraged companies to increase 
employment through subsidy and tax incentives. Measures to increase labor market flexibility 
were also introduced. In terms of welfare policy, the government expanded the provision of 
microfinance and consolidated social safety net. Pension benefits were initiated or extended 
for the elderly and the disabled, while basic livelihood allowance for the poor was increased. 
Like the Kim government, the Lee government also regarded workfare programs highly, in 
order to encourage the disadvantaged to work in return for receiving welfare benefits. 
By the active governmental engagement and cooperation from the parties concerned, 
Korea could overcome the 2008 economic crisis again within very short period. Although the 
Lee government was politically conservative, its general recipe to tackle the economic crisis 
was not much different from those of the progressive Kim government. However, the basic 
policy orientation of the Kim government was more radical and innovative and the Kim 
government intended to fundamentally restructure the economic and financial systems. Power 
elites in the Kim government were generally antagonistic to big conglomerates and 
bureaucrats and they aimed to overturn the old customs of financial and business management 
behaviors. Meanwhile, the Lee government claimed to be business-friendly from its inception 
and President Lee himself was from professional business manager. Accordingly, policy 
responses were more conservative, supportive, and incremental. However, notwithstanding 
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the differences in the spectrum of politics and policy orientation between the Kim and Lee 
governments, Korea overcame economic crisis twice very successfully and this could provide 
useful implications for the countries in economic difficulties. 
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